Fast Talk: My Hardest Decision

Rob Glaser

Founder and Chief executive officer
Real Networks
Seattle, Washington

My hardest strategic decision was making the move to enter the content-subscription business on the Internet. It was the summer of 2000, and we had zero examples of anyone who had successfully sold audiovisual content online. In fact, very few companies were successfully selling any content at all. We knew that with broadband coming soon and with our new technology -- RealVideo 8 -- we could deliver an experience that was truly compelling.

Two and a half years later, we have 1 million subscribers to our service. Our revenue is at $46.9 million, which is flat from last quarter, but our subscription base is up 70% on an annual basis. The service is rising in a way that helps counteract the effects of the continued sluggishness in much of the IT sector.

It was a controversial decision within our company to get into content delivery, but it turned out to be the right decision. We were originally a pure consumer software - sales company. Other people did content. There were a number of companies that had considered doing what we did, and they were told to pick one or the other. My view was that we were unique in our ability to straddle both. And when I look at what has happened to pure tech businesses since then, I'm glad that I took that view.

The key is that we didn't make the decision at a time when we had already hit a wall. Given what has happened with both the advertising and the technology industries, our timing turned out to be very fortuitous. The time to plant seed corn is not when you're starving; it's when you see new opportunities for growth or when you first see storm clouds on the horizon.

General Wesley Clark (Ret.)

Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Little Rock, Arkansas

The hardest decision I ever had to make was to plan a mission that was never executed. It was June 11, 1999, at the end of the NATO air campaign against Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic, and the cease-fire and peace agreement had just been completed and ratified the evening before. But as we were awaiting word on Serb forces evacuating Kosovo, we began to suspect that the Russian forces in Bosnia were racing to take the place of the Serbs at the critical airfield near Pristina. Had they succeeded in getting there and then using the airfield to fly in reinforcements, Kosovo could have been fractured and then partitioned. This would have vitiated all of NATO's efforts during its air campaign.

British and American political leaders were stunned by the Russians' road march toward Kosovo. They didn't want to believe that the Russians would undercut NATO. And they were concerned that if we did anything to react to the Russians, it might escalate into a conflict. But it was my job to consider military action, and to do that, we needed a plan. I ordered that the plan be developed.

As the phone calls cascaded in and the fears mounted in London and Washington, I pressed to complete the planning and to then evaluate the risks and make the decision. But eventually, we were directed to cease the planning and were told that the Russians weren't coming. But planning was the right thing to do, even if the political authorities decided not to act. (But their information was wrong: The Russians did occupy the airfield, and only through the assistance of strong diplomats in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania did we avoid Russian reinforcements on the ground in NATO.)